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ABSTRACT
Many online applications, such as online social networks or knowl-
edge bases, are often attacked by malicious users who commit dif-
ferent types of actions such as vandalism on Wikipedia or fraudulent
reviews on eBay. Currently, most of the fraud detection approaches
require a training dataset that contains records of both benign and
malicious users. However, in practice, there are often no or very
few records of malicious users. In this paper, we develop one-class
adversarial nets (OCAN) for fraud detection with only benign users
as training data. OCAN first uses LSTM-Autoencoder to learn the
representations of benign users from their sequences of online activ-
ities. It then detects malicious users by training a discriminator of a
complementary GAN model that is different from the regular GAN
model. Experimental results show that our OCAN outperforms the
state-of-the-art one-class classification models and achieves com-
parable performance with the latest multi-source LSTM model that
requires both benign and malicious users in the training phase.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online platforms such as online social networks (OSNs) and knowl-
edge bases play a major role in online communication and knowl-
edge sharing. However, there are various malicious users who con-
duct various fraudulent actions, such as spams, rumors, and van-
dalism, imposing severe security threats to OSNs and their legiti-
mate participants. For example, the crowdsourcing mechanism of
Wikipedia attracts the attention of vandals who involve in various
vandalism actions like spreading false or misleading information
to Wikipedia users. Meanwhile, fraudsters in the OSNs can also
easily register fake accounts, inject fake content, or take fraudulent
activities. To protect legitimate users, most Web platforms have tools
or mechanisms to block malicious users. For example, Wikipedia
adopts ClueBot NG [8] to detect and revert obvious bad edits, thus
helping administrators to identify and block vandals.
Detecting malicious users has also attracted increasing attention
in the research community [6, 19, 21, 47, 48]. For example, research
in [21] focused on predicting whether a Wikipedia user is a vandal
based on his edits. The VEWS system adopted a set of behavior
features based on user edit-patterns, and used several traditional clas-
sifiers (e.g., random forest or SVM) to detect vandals. To improve
detection accuracy and avoid manual feature reconstruction, a multi-
source long-short term memory network (M-LSTM) was proposed
to detect vandals [49]. M-LSTM is able to capture different aspects
of user edits and the learned user representations can be further
used to analyze user behaviors. However, these detection models
are trained over a training dataset that consists of both positive data
(benign users) and negative data (malicious users). In practice, there
are often no or very few records from malicious users in the collected
training data. Manually labeling a large number of malicious users
is tedious.
In this work, we tackle the problem of identifying malicious users
when only benign users are observed. The basic idea is to adopt a
generative model to generate malicious users with only given benign
users. Generative adversarial networks (GAN) as generative models
have demonstrated impressive performance in modeling the real data
distribution and generating high quality synthetic data that is similar
to real data [11, 35]. However, given benign users, a regular GAN
model is unable to generate malicious users.
We develop one-class adversarial nets (OCAN) for fraud detec-
tion. During training, OCAN contains two phases. First, OCAN
adopts the LSTM-Autoencoder [40] to encode the benign users into
a hidden space based on their online activities, and the encoded
vectors are called benign user representations. Then, OCAN trains
improved generative adversarial nets in which the discriminator is
trained to be a classifier for distinguishing benign users and mali-
cious users with the generator producing potential malicious users.
To this end, we adopt the idea that the generator is trained to generate
complementary samples instead of matching the original data distri-
bution [9]. In particular, we propose a complementary GAN model.
The generator of the complementary GAN aims to generate samples
that are complementary to the representations of benign users, i.e.,
the potential malicious users. The discriminator is trained to separate
benign users and complementary samples. Since the behaviors of
malicious users and that of benign users are complementary, we
expect the discriminator can distinguish benign users and malicious
users. By combining the encoder of LSTM-Autoencoder and the
discriminator of the complementary GAN, OCAN can accurately
predict whether a new user is benign or malicious based on his online
activities.
The advantages of OCAN for fraud detection are as follows.
First, since OCAN does not require any information about malicious
users, we do not need to manually compose a mixed training dataset,
thus more adaptive to different types of malicious user identification
tasks. Second, different from existing one-class classification models,
OCAN generates complementary samples of benign users and trains
the discriminator to separate complementary samples from benign
users, enabling the trained discriminator to better separate malicious
users from benign users. Third, OCAN can capture the sequential
information of user activities. After training, the detection model can
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adaptively update a user representation once the user commits a new
action and predict whether the user is a fraud or not dynamically.
2 RELATED WORK
Fraud detection: Due to the openness and anonymity of Internet,
the online platforms attract a large number of malicious users, such
as vandals, trolls, and sockpuppets. Many fraud detection techniques
have been developed in recent years [1, 4, 16, 20, 47], including
content-based approaches and graph-based approaches. The content-
based approaches extract content features, (i.e., text, URL), to iden-
tify malicious users from user activities on social networks [2]. Mean-
while, graph-based approaches identify frauds based on network
topologies. Research in [48] proposed two deep neural networks
for fraud detection on a signed graph. Often based on unsupervised
learning, the graph-based approaches consider fraud as anomalies
and extract various graph features associated with nodes, edges,
ego-net, or communities from the graph [1, 28, 32].
Fraud detection is also related to the malicious behavior and
misinformation detection, including detecting the vandalism edits on
Wikipedia or Wikidata, rumor and fake review detection. Research
in [13] developed both content and context features of a Wikidata
revision to identify the vandalism edit. Research in [22] focused on
detecting hoaxes on Wikipedia by finding characteristic in terms
of article content and features of the editor who created the hoax.
In [29], different types of behavior features were extracted and used
to detect fake reviews on Yelp. Research in [26] have identified
several representative behaviors of review spammers. Research in
[36] proposed a framework that combined the text, metadata as well
as relational data to detect suspicious users and reviews. Research in
[46] studied the co-anomaly patterns in multiple review-based time
series. Some researches further focused on detecing frauders who
delibrately evaded the detection by mimicing normal users [15, 45].
Deep neural network: Deep neural networks have achieved promis-
ing results in computer vision, natural language processing, and
speech recognition [23]. Recurrent neural network as one type of
deep neural networks is widely used for modeling time sequence
data [12, 31]. However, it is difficult to train standard RNNs over
long sequences of text because of gradient vanishing and explod-
ing [3]. Long shot-term Memory (LSTM) [14] was proposed to
model temporal sequences and capture their long-range dependen-
cies more accurately than the standard RNNs. LSTM-Autoencoder
is a sequence-to-sequence model that has been widely used for para-
graph generation [25, 30, 41], video representation [40], etc. GAN is
a framework for estimating generative models via an adversarial pro-
cess [11]. Recently, generative adversarial nets (GAN) have achieved
great success in computer vision tasks, including image generation
[24, 35, 39] and image classification [5, 33, 39]. Currently, the GAN
model is usually applied on two or multi-class datasets instead of
one-class.
One-class classification: One-class classification (OCC) algorithms
aim to build classification models when only one class of samples
are observed and the other class of samples are absent [18], which is
also related to the novelty detection [34]. One-class support vector
machine (OSVM), as one of widely adopted for one class classi-
fication, aims to separate one class of samples from all the others
by constructing a hyper-sphere around the observed data samples
[27, 43]. Other traditional classification models also extend to the
one-class scenario. For example, one-class nearest neighbor (OCNN)
[42] predicts the class of a sample based on its distance to its nearest
neighbor in the training dataset. One-class Gaussian process (OCGP)
chooses a proper GP prior and derives membership scores for one-
class classification [17]. However, OCNN and OCGP need to set
a threshold to detect another class of data. The threshold is either
set by a domain expert or tuned based on a small set of two-class
labeled data. In this work, we propose a framework that combines
LSTM-Autoencoder and GAN to detect vandals with only knowing
benign users. To our best knowledge, this is the first work that exam-
ines the use of deep learning models for fraud detection when only
one-class training data is available. Meanwhile, comparing to exist-
ing one-class algorithms, our model trains a classifier by generating
a large number of “novel” data and does not require any labeled data
to tune parameters.
3 PRELIMINARY
3.1 Long Short-Term Memory Network
Long short-term memory network (LSTM) is one type of recurrent
neural network. Given a sequence X = (x1, . . . , xt , . . . , xT ) where
xt ∈ Rd denotes the input at the t-th step, LSTM maintains a hidden
state vector ht ∈ Rh to keep track the sequence information from
the current input xt and the previous hidden state ht−1. The hidden
state ht is computed by
c˜t = tanh(Wcxt + Ucht−1 + bc ),
it = σ (Wixt + Uiht−1 + bi ),
ft = σ (Wf xt + Uf ht−1 + bf ),
ot = σ (Woxt + Uoht−1 + bo ),
ct = it ⊙ c˜t + ft ⊙ ct−1,
ht = ot ⊙ tanh(ct ),
(1)
where σ is the sigmoid function; ⊙ represents element-wise product;
it , ft , ot , ct indicate the input gate, forget gate, output gate, and
cell activation vectors and c˜t denotes the intermediate vector of cell
state; W and U are the weight parameters; b is the bias term.
We simplify the update of each LSTM step described in Equation
1 as
ht = LSTM(xt , ht−1), (2)
where xt is the input of the current step; ht−1 is the hidden vector
of the last step; ht indicates the output of the current step.
3.2 Generative Adversarial Nets
Generative adversarial nets (GAN) are generative models that consist
of two components: a generator G and a discriminator D. Typically,
both G and D are multilayer neural networks. G(z) generates fake
samples from a prior pz on a noise variable z and learns a generative
distribution pG to match the real data distribution pdata. On the con-
trary, the discriminative model D is a binary classifier that predicts
whether an input is a real data x or a generated fake data from G(z).
Hence, the objective function of D is defined as:
max
D
Ex∼pdata [logD(x)] + Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))], (3)
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where D(·) outputs the probability that · is from the real data rather
than the generated fake data. In order to make the generative dis-
tribution pG close to the real data distribution pdata, G is trained by
fooling the discriminator not be able to distinguish the generated
data from the real data. Thus, the objective function of G is defined
as:
min
G
Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))]. (4)
Minimizing the Equation 4 is achieved if the discriminator is fooled
by generated data G(z) and predicts high probability that G(z) is real
data.
Overall, GAN is formalized as a minimax game min
G
max
D
V (G,D)
with the value function:
V (G,D) = Ex∼pdata [logD(x)] + Ez∼pz [log(1 − D(G(z)))]. (5)
Theoretical analysis shows that GAN aims to minimize the Jensen-
Shannon divergence between the data distribution pdata and the gen-
erative distribution pG [11]. The minimization of JS divergence is
achieved when pG = pdata. Therefore, GAN is trained by distinguish-
ing the real data and generated fake data.
4 OCAN: ONE-CLASS ADVERSARIAL NETS
4.1 Framework Overview
OCAN contains two phases during training. The first phase is to learn
user representations. As shown in the left side of Figure 1, LSTM-
Autoencoder is adopted to learn the benign user representations from
the benign user activity sequences. The LSTM-Autoencoder model
is a sequence-to-sequence model that consists of two LSTM models
as the encoder and decoder respectively. The encoder computes the
hidden representation of an input, and the decoder computes the
reconstructed input based on the hidden representation. The trained
LSTM-Autoencoder can capture the salient information of users’
activity sequences because the objective function is to make the
reconstructed input close to the original input. Furthermore, the
encoder of the trained LSTM-Autoencoder, when deployed for fraud
detection, is expected to map the benign users and malicious users to
relatively separate regions in the continuous feature space because
the activity sequences of benign and malicious users are different.
Given the user representations, the second phase is to train a com-
plementary GAN with a discriminator that can clearly distinguish
the benign and malicious users. The generator of the complementary
GAN aims to generate complementary samples that are in the low-
density area of benign users, and the discriminator aims to separate
the real and complementary benign users. The discriminator then has
the ability to detect malicious users which locate in separate regions
from benign users. The framework of training complementary GAN
for fraud detection is shown in the right side of Figure 1.
The pseudo-code of training OCAN is shown in Algorithm 1.
Given a training dataset Mbenign that contains activity sequence fea-
ture vectors of N benign users, we first train the LSTM-Autoencoder
model (Lines 3–9). After training the LSTM-Autoencoder, we adopt
the encoder in the LSTM-Autoencoder model to compute the benign
user representation (Lines 11–14). Finally, we use the benign user
representation to train the complementary GAN (Lines 16–20). For
simplicity, we write the algorithm with a minibatch size of 1, i.e., it-
erating each user in the training dataset to train LSTM-Autoencoder
and GAN. In practice, we sample m real benign users and use the
generator to generatem complementary samples in a minibatch. In
our experiments, the size of minibatch is 32.
Our OCAN moves beyond the naive approach of adopting a regu-
lar GAN model in the second phase. The generator of a regular GAN
aims to generate the representations of fake benign users that are
close to the representations of real benign users. The discriminator
of a regular GAN is to identify whether an input is a representation
of a real benign user or a fake benign user from the generator. How-
ever, one potential drawback of the regular GAN is that once the
discriminator is converged, the discriminator cannot have high confi-
dence on separating real benign users from real malicious users. We
denote the OCAN with the regular GAN as OCAN-r and compare
its performance with OCAN in the experiment.
Algorithm 1: Training One-Class Adversarial Nets
Inputs :Training dataset Mbenign = {X1, · · · ,XN },
Training epochs for LSTM-Autoencoder
EpochAE and GAN EpochGAN
Outputs :Well-trained LSTM-Autoencoder and
complementary GAN
1 initialize parameters in LSTM-Autoencoder and
complementary GAN;
2 j ← 0;
3 while j < EpochAE do
4 foreach user u inMbenign do
5 compute the reconstructed sequence of user activities
by LSTM-Autoencoder (Eq. 6, 8, and 9);
6 optimize the parameters in LSTM-Autoencoder with
the loss function Eq. 10;
7 end
8 j ← j + 1;
9 end
10 V = ∅;
11 foreach user u inMbenign do
12 compute the benign user representation vu by the encoder
of LSTM-Autoencoder (Eq. 6, 7);
13 V+ = vu ;
14 end
15 j ← 0;
16 while j < EpochGAN do
17 foreach benign user representation vu inV do
18 optimize the discriminator D and generator G with loss
functions Eq. 16, 14, respectively;
19 end
20 end
21 return well-trained LSTM-Autoencoder and complementary
GAN
4.2 LSTM-Autoencoder for User Representation
The first phase of OCAN is to encode users to a continuous hidden
space. Since each online user has a sequence of activities (e.g., edit
a sequence of pages), we adopt LSTM-Autoencoder to transform a
variable-length user activity sequence into a fixed-dimension user
3
Figure 1: The training framework of OCAN
representation. Formally, given a user u with T activities, we rep-
resent the activity sequence as Xu = (x1, . . . , xt , . . . , xT ) where
xt ∈ Rd is the t-th activity feature vector.
Encoder: The encoder encodes the user activity sequence Xu to
a user representation with an LSTM model:
hent = LSTM
en (xt , hent−1), (6)
where xt is the feature vector of the t-th activity; hent indicates the
t-th hidden vector of the encoder.
The last hidden vector henT captures the information of a whole
user activity sequence and is considered as the user representation v:
v = henT . (7)
Decoder: In our model, the decoder adopts the user representation
v as the input to reconstruct the original user activity sequence X:
hdet = LSTM
de (v, hdet−1), (8)
xˆt = f (hdet ), (9)
where hdet is the t-th hidden vector of the decoder; xˆt indicates
the t-th reconstructed activity feature vector; f (·) denotes a neural
network to compute the sequence outputs from hidden vectors of
the decoder. Note that we adopt v as input of the whole sequence of
the decoder, which has achieved great performance on sequence-to-
sequence models [7].
The objective function of LSTM-Autoencoder is:
L(AE)(xˆt , xt ) =
T∑
t=1
(xˆt − xt )2, (10)
where xt (xˆt ) is the t-th (reconstructed) activity feature vector. After
training, the last hidden vector of encoder hT can reconstruct the
sequence of user feature vectors. Thus, the representation of user
v = henT captures the salient information of user behavior.
4.3 Complementary GAN
The generator G of complementary GAN is a feedforward neu-
ral network where its output layer has the same dimension as the
user representation v. Formally, we define the generated samples as
v˜ = G(z). Unlike the generator in a regular GAN which is trained
to match the distribution of the generated fake benign user repre-
sentation with that of benign user representation pdata, the generator
G of complementary GAN learns a generative distribution pG that
is close to the complementary distribution p∗ of the benign user
representations, i.e., pG = p∗. The complementary distribution p∗ is
defined as:
p∗(v˜) =
{ 1
τ
1
pdata(v˜) if pdata(v˜) > ϵ and v˜ ∈ Bv
C if pdata(v˜) ≤ ϵ and v˜ ∈ Bv,
(11)
where ϵ is a threshold to indicate whether the generated samples are
in high-density regions; τ is a normalization term; C is a small con-
stant; Bv is the space of user representation. To make the generative
distribution pG close to the complementary distribution p∗, the com-
plementary generator G is trained to minimize the KL divergence
between pG and p∗. Based on the definition of KL divergence, we
have the following objective function:
LKL(pG ∥p∗) = −H(pG ) − Ev˜∼pG logp∗(v˜)
= −H(pG ) + Ev˜∼pG logpdata(v˜)1[pdata(v˜) > ϵ]
+ Ev˜∼pG (1[pdata(v˜) > ϵ] logτ − 1[pdata(v˜) ≤ ϵ] logC),
(12)
where H(·) is the entropy, and 1[·] is the indicator function. The
last term of Equation 12 can be omitted because both τ and C are
constant terms and the gradients of the indicator function 1[·] with
respect to parameters of the generator are mostly zero.
Meanwhile, the complementary generator G adopts the feature
matching loss [37] to ensure that the generated samples are con-
strained in the space of user representation Bv.
Lfm =∥ Ev˜∼pG f (v˜) − Ev∼pdata f (v) ∥2, (13)
where f (·) denotes the output of an intermediate layer of the dis-
criminator used as a feature representation of v.
Thus, the complete objective function of the generator is defined
as:
min
G
−H(pG ) + Ev˜∼pG logpdata(v˜)1[pdata(v˜) > ϵ]
+ ∥ Ev˜∼pG f (v˜) − Ev∼pdata f (v) ∥2 .
(14)
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Overall, the objective function of the complementary generator aims
to let the generative distribution pG close to the complementary
samples p∗, i.e., pG = p∗, and make the generated samples from
different regions (but in the same space of user representations) than
those of the benign users.
Figure 2 illustrates the difference of the generators of regular
GAN and complementary GAN. The objective function of the gener-
ator of regular GAN in Equation 4 is trained to fool the discriminator
by generating fake benign users similar to the real benign users.
Hence, as shown in Figure 2a, the generator of regular GAN gen-
erates the distribution of fake benign users that have the similar
distribution of real benign users in the feature space. On the contrary,
the objective function of the generator of complementary GAN in
Equation 14 is trained to generate complementary samples that are
in the low-density regions of benign users (shown in Figure 2b).
(a) Regular GAN (b) Complementary GAN
Figure 2: Demonstrations of the ideal generators of regular
GAN and complementary GAN. The blue dot line indicates the
high density regions of benign users.
To optimize the objective function of generator, we need to ap-
proximate the entropy of generated samples H(pG ) and the proba-
bility distribution of real samples pdata. To minimize −H(pG ), we
adopt the pull-away term (PT) proposed by [9, 50] that encourages
the generated feature vectors to be orthogonal. The PT term increases
the diversity of generated samples and can be considered as a proxy
for minimizing −H(pG ). The PT term is defined as
LPT = 1
N (N − 1)
N∑
i
N∑
j,i
( f (v˜i )
T f (v˜j )
∥ f (v˜i ) ∥∥ f (v˜j ) ∥ )
2, (15)
where N is the size of a mini-batch. The probability distribution of
real samples pdata is usually unavailable, and approximating pdata
is computationally expensive. We adopt the approach proposed by
[38] that a discriminator from a regular GAN can detect whether
the data from the real data distribution pdata or from the generator’s
distribution. The basic idea is that the discriminator is able to detect
whether a sample is from the real data distribution pdata or from the
generator when the generator is trained to generate samples that are
close to real benign users. Hence, the discriminator is sufficient to
identify the data points that are above a threshold of pdata during
training. We separately train a regular GAN model based on benign
user representations and use the discriminator of the regular GAN
as a proxy to evaluate pdata(v˜) > ϵ .
The discriminator D takes the benign user representation v and
generated user representation v˜ as inputs and tries to distinguish v
from v˜. As a classifier, D is a standard feedforward neural network
with a softmax function as its output layer, and the objective function
of D is:
max
D
Ev∼pdata [logD(v)] + Ev˜∼pG [log(1 − D(v˜))]+
Ev∼pdata [D(v) logD(v)].
(16)
The first two terms in Equation 16 are the objective function of dis-
criminator in the regular GAN model. Therefore, the discriminator
of complementary GAN is trained to separate the benign users and
complementary samples. The last term in Equation 16 is a condi-
tional entropy term which encourages the discriminator to detect
real benign users with high confidence. Then, the discriminator is
able to separate the benign and malicious users clearly.
Although the objective functions of the discriminators of regu-
lar GAN and complementary GAN are similar, the capabilities of
discriminators of regular GAN and complementary GAN for ma-
licious detection are different. The discriminator of regular GAN
aims to separate the benign users and generated fake benign users.
However, after training, the generated fake benign users locate in
the same regions as the real benign users (shown in Figure 2a). The
probabilities of real and generated fake benign users predicted by the
discriminator of regular GAN are all close to 0.5. Thus, giving a be-
nign user, the discriminator cannot predict the benign user with high
confidence. On the contrary, the discriminator of complementary
GAN is trained to separate the benign users and generated com-
plementary samples. Since the generated complementary samples
have the same distribution as the malicious users (shown in Figure
2b), the discriminator of complementary GAN can also detect the
malicious users.
Figure 3: The fraud detection model
Algorithm 2: Fraud Detection
Inputs :Testing dataset Mtest = {X1, · · · ,XN },
Well-trained LSTM-Autoencoder and GAN
Outputs : the user labels Y in Mtest
1 Y = ∅;
2 foreach user u inMtest do
3 compute the user representation vu by the encoder in
LSTM-Autoencoder (Eq. 6, 7);
4 predict the label yˆu of the user by D(vu )
5 Y+ = yˆu
6 end
7 return the user labels Y
5
5 FRAUD DETECTION MODEL
Although the training procedure of OCAN contains two phases that
train LSTM-Autoencoder and complementary GAN successively,
the fraud detection model is an end-to-end model. We show the
procedure pseudocode of detecting fraud in Algorithm 2 and illus-
trate its structure in Figure 3. To detect a malicious user, we first
compute the user representation vu based on the encoder in the
LSTM-Autoencoder model (Line 3). Then, we predict the user label
based on the discriminator of complementary GAN, i.e., p(yˆu |vu ) =
D(vu ).
Early fraud detection: The upper-left region of Figure 3 shows
that our OCAN model can also achieve early detection of malicious
users. Given a useru, at each step t , the hidden states henut are updated
until the t-th step by taking the current feature vector xut as input
and are able to capture the user behavior information until the t-th
step. Thus, the user representation at the t-th step is denoted as
vut = h
en
ut . Finally, we can use the discriminator D to calculate the
probability p(yˆut |vut ) = D(vut ) of the user to be a malicious user
based on the current step user representation vt .
6 EXPERIMENTS
6.1 Experiment Setup
Dataset: To evaluate OCAN, we focus on one type of malicious
users, i.e., vandals on Wikipedia. We conduct our evaluation on
UMDWikipedia dataset [21]. This dataset contains information of
around 770K edits from Jan 2013 to July 2014 (19 months) with
17105 vandals and 17105 benign users. Each user edits a sequence
of Wikipedia pages. We keep those users with the lengths of edit
sequence range from 4 to 50. After this preprocessing, the dataset
contains 10528 benign users and 11495 vandals.
To compose the feature vector xt of the user’s t-th edit, we adopt
the following edit features: (1) whether or not the user edited on
a meta-page; (2) whether or not the user consecutively edited the
pages less than 1 minutes; (3) whether or not the user’s current edit
page had been edited before; (4) whether or not the user’s current
edit would be reverted.
We further evaluate our model on a credit card transaction dataset
in Section 6.5. Although it is not a sequence dataset, it can still be
used to compare the performance of OCAN against baselines in the
context of one-class fraud detection.
Hyperparameters: For LSTM-Autoencoder, the dimension of the
hidden layer is 200, and the training epoch is 20. For the complemen-
tary GAN model, both discriminator and generator are feedforward
neural networks. Specifically, the discriminator contains 2 hidden
layers which are 100 and 50 dimensions. The generator takes the
50 dimensions of noise as input, and there is one hidden layer with
100 dimensions. The output layer of the generator has the same di-
mension as the user representation which is 200 in our experiments.
The training epoch of complementary GAN is 50. The threshold ϵ
defined in Equation 14 is set as the 5-quantile probability of real
benign users predicted by a pre-trained discriminator. We evaluated
several values from 4-quantile to 10-quantile and found the results
are not sensitive.
Repeatability: Our software together with the datasets used in this
paper are available at https://github.com/PanpanZheng/OCAN
6.2 Comparison with One-Class Classification
Baselines: We compare OCAN with the following widely used one-
class classification approaches:
• One-class nearest neighbors (OCNN) [42] labels a testing
sample based on the distance from the sample to its nearest
neighbors in training dataset and the average distance of
those nearest neighbors. If the difference between these two
distances is larger than a threshold, the testing sample is an
anomaly.
• One-class Gaussian process (OCGP) [17] is a one-class clas-
sification model based on Gaussian process regression.
• One-class SVM (OCSVM) [43] adopts support vector ma-
chine to learn a decision hypersphere around the positive data,
and considers samples located outside this hypersphere as
anomalies.
For baslines, we use the implementation provided in NDtool 1.
The hyperparameters of baselines set as default values in NDtool.
Note that both OCNN and OCGP require a small portion (5% in our
experiments) of vandals as a validation dataset to tune an appropriate
threshold for vandal detection. However, OCAN does not require
any vandals for training and validation. Since the baselines are not
sequence models, we compare OCAN to baselines in two ways.
First, we concatenate all the edit feature vectors of a user to a raw
feature vector as an input to baselines. Second, the baselines have
the same inputs as the discriminator, i.e., the user representation
v computed from the encoder of LSTM-Autoencoder. Meanwhile,
OCAN cannot adopt the raw feature vectors as inputs to detect
vandals. This is because GAN is only suitable for real-valued data
[11].
To evaluate the performance of vandal detection, we randomly
select 7000 benign users as the training dataset and 3000 benign
users and 3000 vandals as the testing dataset. We report the mean
value and standard deviation based on 10 different runs. Table 1
shows the means and standard deviations of the precision, recall,
F1 score and accuracy for vandal detection. First, OCAN achieves
better performances than baselines in terms of F1 score and accuracy
in both input settings. It means the discriminator of complemen-
tary GAN can be used as a one-class classifier for vandal detection.
We can further observe that when the baselines adopt the raw fea-
ture vector instead of user representation, the performances of both
OCNN and OCGP decrease significantly. It indicates that the user
representations computed by the encoder of LSTM-Autoencoder
capture the salient information about user behavior and can improve
the performance of one-class classifiers. However, we also notice
that the standard deviations of OCAN are higher than the baselines
with user representations as inputs. We argue that this is because
GAN is widely known for difficult to train. Thus, the stability of
OCAN is relatively lower than the baselines.
Furthermore, we show the experimental results of OCAN-r, which
adopts the regular GAN model instead of the complementary GAN
in the second training phase of OCAN, in the last row of Table 1. We
can observe that the performance of OCAN is better than OCAN-r.
It indicates that the discriminator of complementary GAN which
1http://www.robots.ox.ac.uk/~davidc/publications_NDtool.php
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Table 1: Vandal detection results (mean±std.) on precision, recall, F1 and accuracy
Input Algorithm Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Raw feature vector
OCNN 0.5680 ± 0.0129 0.8646 ± 0.0599 0.6845 ± 0.0184 0.6027 ± 0.0161
OCGP 0.5767 ± 0.0087 0.9000 ± 0.0560 0.7023 ± 0.0193 0.6196 ± 0.0142
OCSVM 0.6631 ± 0.0057 0.9829 ± 0.0011 0.7919 ± 0.0040 0.7417 ± 0.0064
User representation
OCNN 0.8314 ± 0.0351 0.8028 ± 0.0476 0.8150 ± 0.0163 0.8181 ± 0.0153
OCGP 0.8381±, 0.0225 0.8289 ± 0.0374 0.8326 ± 0.0158 0.8337 ± 0.0139
OCSVM 0.6558 ± 0.0058 0.9590 ± 0.0096 0.7789 ± 0.0064 0.7278 ± 0.0080
OCAN 0.9067 ± 0.0615 0.9292 ± 0.0348 0.9010 ± 0.0228 0.8973 ± 0.0244
User representation OCAN-r 0.8673 ± 0.0355 0.8759 ± 0.0529 0.8701 ± 0.0267 0.8697 ± 0.0244
is trained on real and complementary samples can more accurately
separate the benign users and vandals.
Table 2: Early Vandal detection results on precision, recall, F1,
and the average number of edits before the vandals are blocked
Vandals Precision Recall F1 Edits
M-LSTM
7000 0.8416 0.9637 0.8985 7.21
1000 0.9189 0.8910 0.9047 5.98
400 0.9639 0.6767 0.7951 3.64
300 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
OCAN 0 0.8014 0.9081 0.8459 7.23
OCAN-r 0 0.7228 0.8968 0.7874 7.18
6.3 Comparison with M-LSTM for Early Vandal
Detection
We further compare the performance of OCAN in terms of early
vandal detection with one latest deep learning based vandal detection
model, M-LSTM, developed in [49]. Note that M-LSTM assumes a
training dataset that contains both vandals and benign users. In our
experiments, we train our OCAN with the training data consisting of
7000 benign users and no vandals and train M-LSTM with a training
data consisting the same 7000 benign users and a varying number
of vandals (from 7000 to 100). For OCAN and M-LSTM, we use
the same testing dataset that contains 3000 benign users and 3000
vandals. Note that in OCAN and M-LSTM, the hidden state hent of
the LSTM model captures the up-to-date user behavior information
and hence we can achieve early vandal detection. The difference is
that the M-LSTM model uses hent as the input of a classifier directly
whereas OCAN further trains complementary GAN and uses its
discriminator as a classifier to make the early vandal detection. In
this experiment, instead of applying the classifier on the final user
representation v = henT , the classifiers of M-LSTM and OCAN are
applied on each step of LSTM hidden state hent and predict whether
a user is a vandal after the user commits the t-th action.
Table 2 shows comparison results in terms of the precision, recall,
F1 of early vandal detection, and the average number of edits before
the vandals were truly blocked. We can observe that OCAN achieves
a comparable performance as the M-LSTM when the number of van-
dals in the training dataset is large (1000, 4000, and 7000). However,
M-LSTM has very poor accuracy when the number of vandals in
the training dataset is small. In fact, we observe that M-LSTM could
not detect any vandal when the training dataset contains less than
400 vandals. On the contrary, OCAN does not need any vandal in
the training data.
The experimental results of OCAN-r for early vandal detection
are shown in the last row of Table 2. OCAN-r outperforms M-LSTM
when M-LSTM is trained on a small number of the training dataset.
However, the OCAN-r is not as good as OCAN. It indicates that
generating complementary samples to train the discriminator can
improve the performance of the discriminator for vandal detection.
6.4 OCAN Framework Analysis
Figure 4: Visualization of 3000 benign users (blue star) and
3000 vandals (cyan triangle) based on user representation.
LSTM-Autoencoder: The reason of adopting LSTM-Autoencoder
is that it transforms edit sequences to user representation. It also
helps encode benign users and vandals to relatively different lo-
cations in the hidden space, although the LSTM-Autoencoder is
only trained by benign users. To validate our intuition, we obtain
user representations of the testing dataset by the encoder in the
LSTM-Autoencoder. Then, we map those user representations to a
two-dimensional space based on the Isomap approach [44]. Figure
4 shows the visualization of user representations. We observe that
the benign users and vandals are relatively separated in the two-
dimensional space, indicating the capability of LSTM-Autoencoder.
Complementary GAN vs. Regular GAN:
In our OCAN model, the generator of complementary GAN aims
to generate complementary samples that lie in the low-density region
of real samples, and the discriminator is trained to detect the real and
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(a) Prob. predicted by OCAN (b) Prob. predicted by OCAN-r (c) F1 score of OCAN (d) F1 score of OCAN-r
Figure 5: Training progresses of OCAN (5a,5c) and OCAN-r(5b,5d). Three lines in Figures 5a and 5b indicate the probabilities of
being benign users predicted by the discriminator: real benign users p(y |vB ) (green line) vs. generated samples p(y |v˜) (red broken
line) vs. real malicious users p(y |vM ) (blue dotted line). Figures 5c and 5d show the F1 scores of OCAN and OCAN-r during training.
complementary samples. We examine the training progress of OCAN
in terms of predication accuracy. We calculate probabilities of real
benign users p(y |vB ) (shown as green line in Figure 5a), malicious
users p(y |vM ) (blue dotted line) and generated samples p(y |v˜) (read
broken line) being benign users predicted by the discriminator of
complementary GAN on the testing dataset after each training epoch.
We can observe that after OCAN is converged, the probabilities of
malicious users predicted by the discriminator of complementary
GAN are much lower than that of benign users. For example, at
the epoch 40, the average probability of real benign users p(y |vB )
predicted by OCAN is around 70%, while the average probability of
malicious users p(y |vM ) is only around 30%. Meanwhile, the average
probability of generated complementary samples p(y |v˜) lies between
the probabilities of benign and malicious users.
On the contrary, the generator of a regular GAN in the OCAN-r
model aims to generate fake samples that are close to real samples,
and the discriminator of GAN focuses on distinguishing the real and
generated fake samples. As shown in Figure 5b, the probabilities of
real benign users and probabilities of malicious users predicted by
the discriminator of regular GAN become close to each other during
training. After the OCAN-r is converged, say epoch 120, both the
probabilities of real benign users and malicious users are close to
0.5. Meanwhile, the probability of generated samples is similar to
the probabilities of real benign users and malicious users.
We also show the F1 scores of OCAN and OCAN-r on the testing
dataset after each training epoch in Figure 5c and 5d. We can observe
that the F1 score of OCAN-r is not as stable as (and also a bit lower
than) OCAN. This is because the outputs of the discriminator for
real and fake samples are close to 0.5 after the regular GAN is
converged. If the probabilities of real benign users predicted by the
discriminator of the regular GAN swing around 0.5, the accuracy of
vandal detection will fluctuate accordingly.
We can observe from Figure 5 another nice property of OCAN
compared with OCAN-r for fraud detection, i.e., OCAN is converged
faster than OCAN-r. We can observe that OCAN is converged with
only training 20 epochs while the OCAN-r requires nearly 100
epochs to keep stable. This is because the complementary GAN is
trained to separate the benign and malicious users while the regular
GAN mainly aims to generate fake samples that match the real sam-
ples. In general, matching two distributions requires more training
epochs than separating two distributions. Meanwhile, the feature
matching term adopted in the generator of complementary GAN is
also able to improve the training process [37].
Figure 6: 2D visualization of three types of users: real benign
(blue star), vandal (cyan triangle), and complementary benign
(red dot)
Visualization of three types of users: We project the user represen-
tations of the three types of users (i.e., benign, vandal and comple-
mentary benign generated by OCAN) to a two-dimensional space by
Isomap. Figure 6 visualizes the three types of users. We observe that
the generated complementary users lie in the low-density regions
of real benign users. Meanwhile, the generated samples are also
between the benign users and vandals. Since the discriminator is
trained to separate the benign and complementary benign users, the
discriminator is able to separate benign users and vandals.
Table 3: Clustering results of DBSCAN
Cluster Size Benign Vandal Complement
C1 2537 2448 89 0
C2 2420 93 2327 0
C3 2840 0 0 2840
Isolated 1203 459 584 160
User clustering: To further analyze the complementary GAN model,
we adopt the classic DBSCAN algorithm [10] to cluster 3000 benign
users, 3000 vandals from the testing dataset, and 3000 generated
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Table 4: Fraud detection results (mean±std.) on precision, recall, F1 and accuracy of credit card fraud detection
Input Algorithm Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
Raw feature vector
OCNN 0.8029 ± 0.1497 0.9075 ± 0.0596 0.8383 ± 0.0660 0.8132 ± 0.1082
OCGP 0.9700 ± 0.0222 0.7308 ± 0.0812 0.8302 ± 0.0450 0.8531 ± 0.0324
OCSVM 0.6590 ± 0.0100 0.9404 ± 0.0017 0.7749 ± 0.0068 0.7267 ± 0.0107
OCAN 0.9755 ± 0.0110 0.7416 ± 0.0498 0.8416 ± 0.0330 0.8613 ± 0.0243
Transaction representation
OCNN 0.7058 ± 0.1396 0.9390 ± 0.0786 0.7910 ± 0.0608 0.7401 ± 0.1079
OCGP 0.8813 ± 0.1177 0.8566 ± 0.0822 0.8576 ± 0.0417 0.8536 ± 0.0623
OCSVM 0.6547 ± 0.0151 0.9509 ± 0.0101 0.7755 ± 0.0127 0.7245 ± 0.0185
OCAN 0.9067 ± 0.0614 0.8320 ± 0.0319 0.8656 ± 0.0220 0.8701 ± 0.0264
complementary benign users. Table 3 shows clustering results in-
cluding cluster size and class distributions of each cluster. We set
the maximum radius of the neighborhood ϵ = 1.4305 (the average
distances among the user representations) and the minimum num-
ber of pointsminPts = 180. We observe three clusters where C1 is
benign users, C2 is vandal, and C3 is complementary samples in
addition to 1203 isolated users that could not form any cluster. We
emphasize that our OCAN can still make good predictions of those
isolated points accurately (with 89% accuracy).
We further calculate the centroid of C1, C2 and C3 based on their
user representations and adopt the centroids to calculate distances
among each type of users. The distance between the centroids of
real benign users and complementary benign users is 3.6346, while
the distance between the centroids of real benign users and vandals
is 3.888. Since the discriminator is trained to identify real benign
users and complementary benign users, the discriminator can detect
vandals which have larger distances to real benign users than that of
complementary benign users.
6.5 Case Study on Credit Card Fraud Detection
We further evaluate our model on a credit card fraud detection dataset
2. The dataset records credit card transactions in two days and has
492 frauds out of 284,807 transactions. Each transaction contains 28
features. We adopt 700 genuine transactions as a training dataset and
490 fraud and 490 genuine transactions as a testing dataset. Since the
transaction features of the dataset are numerical data derived from
PCA, OCAN is able to detect frauds by using raw features as inputs.
Meanwhile, we also evaluate the performance of OCAN in the
hidden feature space. Because the transaction in credit card dataset is
not a sequence data, we adopt the regular autoencoder model instead
of LSTM-autoencoder to obtain the transaction representations. In
our experiments, the dimension of transaction representation is 50.
Table 4 shows the classification results of credit card fraud detec-
tion. Overall, the performance of OCAN and baselines are similar
to the results of vandal detection shown in Table 1. OCAN achieves
the best accuracy and F1 with both input settings. Meanwhile, the
performance of OCAN using transaction representations as inputs is
better than using raw features. It shows that OCAN can outperform
the existing one-class classifiers in different datasets and can be
applied to detect different types of malicious users.
2https://www.kaggle.com/dalpozz/creditcardfraud
Testing on an imbalanced dataset. In the real scenario, there are
more genuine transactions than fraud transactions. Hence, after train-
ing OCAN on 700 genuine transactions, we further test OCAN on
an imbalanced dataset which consists of 1000 genuine transactions
and 100 fraud transactions. Figure 7 shows the ROC curve of OCAN
on the unbalanced dataset. It indicates OCAN achieves promising
performance for fraud detection with adopting raw feature vector
and transaction representation as inputs on the imbalanced dataset.
In particular, the AUC of OCAN with raw features is 0.9645, and
the AUC of OCAN with transaction representation is 0.9750.
Figure 7: ROC curve of OCAN on an imbalanced dataset
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed OCAN that consists of LSTM-
Autoencoder and complementary GAN for fraud detection when
only benign users are observed during the training phase. During
training, OCAN adopts LSTM-Autoencoder to learn benign user
representations, and then uses the benign user representations to
train a complementary GAN model. The generator of complemen-
tary GAN can generate complementary benign user representations
that are in the low-density regions of real benign user representa-
tions, while the discriminator is trained to distinguish the real and
complementary benign users. After training, the discriminator is
able to detect malicious users which are outside the regions of be-
nign users. We have conducted theoretical and empirical analysis
to demonstrate the advantages of complementary GAN over regular
GAN. We conducted experiments over two real world datasets and
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showed OCAN outperforms the state-of-the-art one-class classifi-
cation models. Moreover, our OCAN model can also achieve early
vandal detection since OCAN takes the user edit sequences as inputs
and achieved comparable accuracy with the latest M-LSTM model
that needs both benign and vandal users in the training data. In our
future work, we plan to extend the techniques for fraud detection in
the semi-supervised learning scenario.
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